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CONSUMER CONTRACTS IN ACTION
Meirav Furth-Matzkin*
I. INTRODUCTION
Scholars have long recognized the disparities between the law in books 
and law in action.1 Yet, the disparities between the formal rules governing 
consumer transactions and their actual implementation remain 
understudied.2
In this Essay, I focus on the disparities between: (1) contract law and 
consumer contracting realities; (2) the legal protections accorded to con-
sumers and consumers’ perceptions of these rights and remedies; and (3) 
the written terms of consumer agreements and sellers’ enforcement of such 
terms.
By elucidating these disparities, I hope to enable a more nuanced un-
derstanding of the role that contractual language, legal rules, and consumer 
psychology play in shaping sellers’ ongoing relations with consumers, and 
in promoting, or threatening, consumer well-being. The primary goal of this 
Essay is to grapple with one key question: When and how should consumer 
contracts and markets be regulated? Ultimately, unraveling the disparities 
between “contracts-in-books” and “contracts-in-action” could assist policy-
makers in devising regulation to enhance consumer welfare.
II. DISPARITIES BETWEEN CONSUMER CONTRACTS AND THE LAW
There is often a mismatch between the social reality of contracting and the 
law of contracts. One way in which these two diverge is the use of
* Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Los-Angeles School of Law. This Essay
draws on the results of my recent and forthcoming work. This Essay was prepared for the Browning
Symposium on Consumer Law in the 21st Century, hosted by the Montana Law Review on September
25, 2020, presented in a panel on “Real Problems for Real Consumers.” I thank the Symposium Editor,
Ms. Kelsey Dayton, for inviting and hosting me, the Montana Law Review editors for helpful comments,
and the moderator, Mr. Chuck Munson, for helpful feedback and comments. The studies reported in this
Essay were presented in the following publications: Meirav Furth-Matzkin, On the Unexpected Use of
Unenforceable Contract Terms: Evidence from the Residential Rental Market, 9 J. LEGAL ANAL. 1
(2017); Meirav Furth-Matzkin, The Harmful Effects of Unenforceable Contract Terms: Experimental
Evidence, 4 ALA. L. REV. 1032 (2019); Meirav Furth-Matzkin & Roseanna Sommers, Consumer Psy-
chology and the Problem of Fine-Print Fraud, 72 STAN. L. REV. 503 (2020).
1. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910).
2. Commentators have recently begun calling for “studies of consumer contracts” to “move from
looking almost exclusively at the terms of the paper deal to looking at the terms of the real deal.” See
Lisa Bernstein & Hagay Volvovsky, Not What You Wanted to Know: The Real Deal and the Paper Deal
in Consumer Contracts: Comment on the Work of Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, 12 JRSL. REV. LEGAL
STUD. 128, 129 (2015).
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legally unenforceable contract terms.3 Although these terms contravene
mandatory regulation and are unlikely to be upheld by courts, such terms
are routinely included in standard form contracts.4 For example, in previous
work, I found that unenforceable terms are frequently included in residen-
tial lease agreements.5 These included overbroad liability waivers, disclaim-
ers of the landlord’s implied warranty of habitability, unenforceable late
fees or security deposit provisions, and clauses purporting to shift
mandatory maintenance and repair duties from the landlord to the tenant.6
Unenforceable contract terms also play an important role in shaping
consumers’ expectations and beliefs.7 Even if consumers do not read con-
tracts ex ante, before signing the contract, they may read relevant terms ex
post, when facing a problem or dispute with the seller.8 For example, in a
survey of 200 residential tenants, most respondents reported that the lease
agreement was the main source of information about their rights and reme-
dies.9 Therefore, these respondents acted in accordance with their signed
agreements when rental disputes arose.10
A series of randomized experiments further demonstrated that after
reading rental contracts containing unenforceable liability disclaimers, te-
nants were significantly more likely to bear costs that the law imposes on
landlords than were tenants reading contracts with enforceable liability pro-
3. See, e.g., Meirav Furth-Matzkin, On the Unexpected Use of Unenforceable Contract Terms:
Evidence from the Residential Rental Market, 9 J. LEGAL ANAL. 1 (2017) (finding, based on a survey of
residential tenants, that tenants often rely on the written lease agreements as their main, or only, source
of information when disputes with the landlord arise); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Perverse Conse-
quences of Disclosing Standard Terms, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 117 (2017).
4. There is empirical evidence that unenforceable terms are included in various types of contracts,
including lease agreements, insurance policies, sales of goods contracts, and employment agreements.
See, e.g., Furth-Matzkin, supra note 3 (providing evidence in the context of residential lease agree-
ments); Evan Starr et al., Noncompete Agreements in the US Labor Force, J. L. & ECON. (forthcoming)
(providing evidence in the context of employment agreements); Robert L. Tucker, Disappearing Ink:
The Emerging Duty to Remove Invalid Policy Provisions, 42 AKRON L. REV. 519 (2009) (providing
evidence in the context of insurance policies); Jeff Sovern, Report that Companies Include Provisions in
Arbitration Clause that They Know the Arbitrator Won’t Enforce—But that Might Suppress Claims
Even More, PUBLIC CITIZEN: CONSUMER LAW & POLICY BLOG (Mar. 8, 2018).
5. Furth-Matzkin, supra note 3, at 24–29.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Meirav Furth-Matzkin, The Harmful Effects of Unenforceable Contract Terms: Exper-
imental Evidence, 4 ALA. L. REV. 1032 (2019); Evan Starr et al., The Behavioral Effects of (Unenforce-
able) Contracts, J.L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming); Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 3; Dennis P. Stolle &
Andrew J. Slain, Standard Form Contracts and Contract Schemas: A Preliminary Investigation of the
Effects of Exculpatory Clauses on Consumers’ Propensity to Sue, 15 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 83, 91 (1997)
(finding that exculpatory language had a deterrent effect on participants’ willingness to seek legal re-
course).
8. See, e.g., Furth-Matzkin, supra note 7, at 1040.
9. Furth-Matzkin, supra note 3, at 38–40.
10. Id.
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visions.11 Notably, the inclusion of unenforceable terms also discouraged
tenants from searching online for information about their rights as renters;12
and the terms misled even the minority of tenants who conducted online
searches about their rights and remedies.13 What this suggests is that sellers
include these clauses in their contracts because they are effective in shaping
consumers’ expectations and behavior, not in convincing courts.14
Taken together, these findings also suggest that current efforts to pro-
tect consumers are inadequate. Regulatory measures, including Unfair or
Deceptive Acts or Practices Statutes (“UDAP laws”) overly rely on con-
sumers to discipline sellers by asserting their rights through private litiga-
tion. Yet, as long as consumers remain uninformed about the law and rely
on contracts to ascertain scope of their rights, they are unlikely to challenge
sellers who flout the law. It is therefore essential to reconsider current pol-
icy solutions. For example, it might be warranted to encourage (or require)
sellers to use statutory form contracts in certain consumer markets.
III. DISPARITIES BETWEEN THE LAW AND CONSUMERS’ PERCEPTIONS
Current research on unenforceable terms suggests that consumers be-
lieve they will be held to what is written in the contract, even when the law
states otherwise.15 Put differently, there are often disparities between the
legal reality governing consumer transactions and consumers’ legal percep-
tions and intuitions.
In a series of randomized controlled experiments, Roseanna Sommers
and I studied consumers’ legal intuitions about the validity of contractual
clauses that contradict salespeople’s prior assertions. We presented partici-
pants with scenarios in which a salesperson makes a false representation
that is later disclaimed in the contract, and the consumer signs the contract
in reliance on the salesperson’s representation without reading the terms or
noticing the discrepancy.16 Across all experiments, we found that laypeople
11. Id. at 1043–1045.
12. Id. at 1049.
13. Id. at 1050.
14. See, e.g., Furth-Matzkin, supra note 7, at 1058.
15. See, e.g., Furth-Matzkin, supra note 7; Meirav Furth-Matzkin & Roseanna Sommers, Consumer
Psychology and the Problem of Fine-Print Fraud, 72 STAN. L. REV. 503 (2020). This research contrib-
utes to a line of research documenting consumers’ formalistic intuitions about contracts. See, e.g., Tess
Wilkinson-Ryan, Intuitive Formalism in Contract, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 2109 (2015); Tess Wilkinson-
Ryan & David A. Hoffman, The Common Sense of Contract Formation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1269,
1281–98 (2015) (finding that laypeople put excessive weight on written terms compared to oral agree-
ments, believe that contracts are formed primarily through formalities such as signature and payment,
even though contract law does not require such formalities for a contract to be formed, and feel gener-
ally obligated to abide by terms that follow formalized assent processes); Yuval Feldman & Doron
Teichman, Are All Contractual Obligations Created Equal?, 100 GEO. L.J. 5, 5 (2012).
16. Furth-Matzkin & Sommers, supra note 15.
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are contractual formalists, not only because they trust the representations in
the contracts they sign are true but, more profoundly, because they believe
all contracts, even those induced by fraud, are legally binding and not
void.17
This common intuition reflects consumers’ somewhat pessimistic view
of the law. Even though most of the study’s respondents believed it was
unfair to hold consumers to terms they had been deceived into signing, re-
spondents nonetheless assumed the law would enforce such contractual pro-
visions.18 In fact, we found that in many cases, the fact that the contract
contradicted what the consumer was promised prior to signing made almost
no difference in laypeople’s intuitions about whether the contract would, or
should, be enforced as written.19 These findings hold true regardless of
whether the misrepresentation was oral or written, and regardless of the
importance of the transaction.20
These results lead to a troubling conclusion: Consumers may be dis-
couraged from challenging contracts induced by fraud, because they might
blame themselves for failing to read the fine print.21
To mitigate the harms generated by these fraudulent practices, regula-
tors could consider adopting regulation aimed at educating the public about
their legal rights and remedies,22 or alerting consumers to the possibility
that boilerplate provisions might be unenforceable, fraudulent, or void.23
IV. DISPARITIES BETWEEN THE “PAPER DEAL” AND THE “REAL DEAL”
The third and final disparity this Essay addresses is that between the
language of consumer contracts and sellers’ actual practices. While re-
searchers and policymakers have devoted considerable attention to the for-
mal, written terms of consumer contracts (the “paper deal”),24 efforts to
17. Id. at 520–522.
18. Id. at 521.
19. Id. at 532–536.
20. Id. at 542–543.
21. See, e.g., Furth-Matzkin & Sommers, supra note 15, at 542.
22. Id. See also Furth-Matzkin, supra note 7, at 1063; Samuel Becher et al., Seductive Oral Deals,
available at: https://perma.cc/LHN4-RDRT.
23. See supra note 22.
24. For example, scholars have observed that consumer contracts are difficult to read (e.g., Uri
Benoliel & Shmuel I. Becher, The Duty to Read the Unreadable, 60 B. C. L. REV. 2255 (2019)); are
typically pro-seller (e.g., Florencia Marotta-Wurlger, What’s in a Standard Form Contract? An Empiri-
cal Analysis of Software License Agreements, 4 J. LEG. STUD. 677 (2007)); and are frequently drafted in
ways that exploit consumers’ cognitive biases (e.g., OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS (2012); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality,
Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003)). At the same time,
considerably less attention has been given to how these contracts are implemented by sellers on the
ground.
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uncover how these contracts are implemented by sellers on the ground (the
“real deal”) are surprisingly scarce.
This dearth of scholarly attention is puzzling, both because of the im-
portance of the “real deal”—the ways in which sellers actually behave in
the shadow of their formal agreements—to consumers, and because in the
context of business-to-business transactions, there is increasing evidence
the actual implementation of standardized agreements often differs from
how these contracts appear on paper.25 For example, in the 1960s legal
sociologist Stewart Macaulay found that lawyers and businesspeople often
deviate from the terms of their formal agreements in meaningful ways.26
Since then, considerable scholarly attention has been devoted to how con-
tracting parties behave in the realm of commercial agreements,27 while little
is known about how consumer contracts are enforced by sellers.
Commentators have recently begun calling for “studies of consumer
contracts” to shift “from looking almost exclusively at the terms of the pa-
per deal to looking at the terms of the real deal,”28 suggesting the distinc-
tion between formal agreements and their actual implementation may also
be relevant to business-to-consumer contracts.29 Nonetheless, far too little is
known about whether, when, and why sellers depart from their contracts in
meaningful ways.
My working paper on Selective Enforcement of Consumer Contracts
explores the discrepancies between how consumer contracts appear on pa-
per and how they operate on the ground through a large-scale field study of
product returns.30 The study uses an audit technique in which testers are
sent to return non-defective goods to stores with different return policies
25. I borrow the terms “paper deal” and “real deal” from Stewart Macaulay, who used these terms
in his work on divergences between formal agreements and their actual implementation in business-to-
business transactions. See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, The Real and the Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of
Relationships, Complexity and the Urge for Transparent Simple Rules, 66 MOD. L. REV. 44, 79 (2003);
Stewart Macaulay & William Whitford, The Development of Contracts: Law in Action, 87 TEMPLE L.
REV. 793 (2014). See also Bernstein & Volovsky, supra note 2.
26. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC.
REV. 55 (1963).
27. See e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV.
1089 (1981); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1787–88 (1996) (showing that “sophisticated
merchant-transactors” often depart from official terms of agreements because of social norms, commer-
cial custom, trust, or fear of non-legal sanctions, such as reputational damages); Lisa Bernstein, Private
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions,
99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1994) (studying how
disputes are resolved in the cattle industry).
28. See Bernstein & Volvovsky, supra note 2, at 129.
29. See e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Con-
sumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 828 (2006).
30. Meirav Furth-Matzkin, Selective Enforcement of Consumer Contracts: Evidence from the Retail
Market (working paper, 2021).
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and report their return outcomes. The study’s main goal is to test whether
sellers accept returns when they are not obligated to do so according to their
formal policies.31
I find sellers’ enforcement of supposedly rigid, bright-line contractual
provisions is, in practice, considerably more lenient and flexible. Across a
wide variety of stores, a significant proportion of sellers departed from their
formal contractual requirements in favor of consumers by accepting their
returns, either upon their initial requests or after a formal complaint.
These findings indicate that sellers may prefer to complement their
formal contractual terms with a policy of allowing concessions not required
by the contract, rather than writing all the contingencies into the contract
and abiding by it. This approach can be preferred by sellers because the
existence of clear and unconditional terms allows them to deter opportunis-
tic buyers, who would exploit more detailed (or flexible) contractual lan-
guage to extract gains that sellers did not intend to offer.32 The strategy of
adopting a non-customer-facing policy allowing employees discretion to
deviate from the “paper deal” can be seen as an attempt to meet the expecta-
tions of most good faith consumers, while preventing opportunistic buyers
from taking advantage of more lenient terms.
Yet, what are the implications of selective enforcement for consumers?
On one hand, it enables good faith buyers to enjoy better treatment than that
for which they originally contracted, while sellers are able to keep prices
low by screening out the “bad apples” who would take advantage of a more
lenient or flexible term in writing. On the other hand, consumers, to the
extent they are uninformed about sellers’ on-the-ground practices, might
refrain from bringing a just claim to the seller, because they might not real-
31. A preliminary question is whether return policies are legally binding contracts, given that they
are typically presented on the back of the receipt, or on the store’s “terms and conditions” webpage, and
are not always displayed on an in-store sign that the consumer can review prior to purchase. “Pay-now-
terms-later” or “shrink wrap” agreements are generally recognized as legally binding contracts, as long
as the consumer had a reasonable opportunity to cancel the transaction after the terms were made availa-
ble for review. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Bischoff v. DirectTV,
Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1101 (C.D. Cal. 2002); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp.,
998 P.2d 305, 308 (Wash. 2000); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1998).
32. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 12, at 827–28 (“A seller concerned about its reputation
can be expected to treat consumers better than is required by the letter of the contract.”); Clayton P.
Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679, 704–12 (2004) (suggesting
that sellers may use a “contract clause that assigns an entitlement to the seller” to protect themselves
from consumer misbehavior); Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of
How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation between Businesses and Consumers,
104 MICH. L. REV. 857, 858 (2006); Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, Minding the Gap, 51 CONN. L.
REV. 69 (2019).
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ize that they may receive more than what the contract allows.33 While sell-
ers may use complaint-based segmentation to identify high-value consum-
ers, good-faith consumers might be discouraged from complaining even if
they have a meritorious claim.
VI. CONCLUSION
As this Essay reveals, there is still much to be discovered about the
disparities between consumer contracts on paper, in action, and in the law.
There is even more to be learned about the implications of these disparities
for consumers and social welfare. This Essay calls on scholars and policy-
makers to shift their focus from the terms of the “paper deal” to the “real
deal.”
33. Marketing and social psychology research suggests that lower-income consumers and minority
group members typically feel less entitled and are less likely to complain than higher-income consumers
or those belonging to majority groups. E.g., Vincent C. S. Heung & Terry Lam, Customer complaint
behavior towards hotel restaurant services, 14 INT’L J. OF CONTEMP. HOSPITALITY MGMT. 283 (2003);
Paul K. Piff, Wealth and the Inflated Self: Class, Entitlement and Narcissism, 40 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 34 (2014). This means that upper-class white customers might disproportionately bene-
fit from selective enforcement of contracts compared to lower-class, non-white customers. In addition,
sellers themselves might use their discretion to deviate from the formal agreement in a discriminatory
manner.
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